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Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) is a promising technology to enhance
cognitive and physical performance. One of the major areas of interest is the
enhancement of memory function in healthy individuals. The early arrival of tDCS
on the market for lifestyle uses and cognitive enhancement purposes lead to the
voicing of some important ethical concerns, especially because, to date, there are
no official guidelines or evaluation procedures to tackle these issues. The aim of this
article is to review ethical issues related to uses of tDCS for memory enhancement
found in the ethics and neuroscience literature and to evaluate how realistic and
scientifically well-founded these concerns are? In order to evaluate how plausible or
speculative each issue is, we applied the methodological framework described by
Racine et al. (2014) for “informed and reflective” speculation in bioethics. This framework
could be succinctly presented as requiring: (1) the explicit acknowledgment of factual
assumptions and identification of the value attributed to them; (2) the validation of these
assumptions with interdisciplinary literature; and (3) the adoption of a broad perspective
to support more comprehensive reflection on normative issues. We identified four major
considerations associated with the development of tDCS for memory enhancement:
safety, autonomy, justice and authenticity. In order to assess the seriousness and
likelihood of harm related to each of these concerns, we analyzed the assumptions
underlying the ethical issues, and the level of evidence for each of them. We identified
seven distinct assumptions: prevalence, social acceptance, efficacy, ideological stance
(bioconservative vs. libertarian), potential for misuse, long term side effects, and the
delivery of complete and clear information. We conclude that ethical discussion about
memory enhancement via tDCS sometimes involves undue speculation, and closer
attention to scientific and social facts would bring a more nuanced analysis. At this
time, the most realistic concerns are related to safety and violation of users’ autonomy
by a breach of informed consent, as potential immediate and long-term health risks
to private users remain unknown or not well defined. Clear and complete information
about these risks must be provided to research participants and consumers of tDCS
products or related services. Broader public education initiatives and warnings would
also be worthwhile to reach those who are constructing their own tDCS devices.
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INTRODUCTION
Transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) is a
neurostimulation technique that modifies neuronal activity
by delivering a weak electrical current to neural tissues through
the scalp. To date, tDCS has demonstrated potential for memory
improvement in both healthy people and diverse patient
populations. Accordingly, tDCS is considered as a promising
alternative to conventional pharmacological treatment of many
diseases, including mild cognitive impairment, depression,
Alzheimer’s disease, and attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder—ADHD (Clark and Parasuraman, 2014). Current
research is underway to determine if tDCS could reduce
cognitive decline in elderly people associated with normal aging
(Hsu et al., 2015). In healthy people, numerous studies show
that the use of tDCS could lead to significant improvements
of various cognitive functions, such as attention, language
acquisition, problem solving, memory and learning, especially
when coupled with training activity as learning tasks (Levasseur-
Moreau et al., 2013; Coffman et al., 2014). These improvements
are often described as constituting another form of cognitive
enhancement.
The early arrival of tDCS on the market (Anonymous, 2013;
Bikson et al., 2013; Dubljevi´c et al., 2014) for lifestyle uses
and cognitive enhancement purposes lead to the voicing of
some important ethical concerns such as safety, autonomy,
justice and authenticity (Hamilton et al., 2011; Farah et al.,
2014). To date, there are no official guidelines or evaluation
procedures to tackle these issues although current research
ethics policies and laws provide a general framework. At
the same time, there are several calls for the introduction of
specific policies and regulatory measures, notably because
of the limited knowledge of long term physiological and
social implications of potential wide-spread use of tDCS (Fitz
and Reiner, 2013; Maslen et al., 2014a; Dubljevi´c, 2015). A
major challenge for such policy and eventual regulation is
to distinguish between substantive and imminent issues vs.
trivial and farfetched ones. Accordingly, the aim of this article
is to analyze the speculative aspects of specific ethical issues
related to the uses of tDCS for memory enhancement. We
apply the methodological framework proposed by Racine
et al. (2014) for informed and reflective pro-active analysis
in bioethics. This framework implies three methodological
guideposts: (1) the explicit acknowledgment of factual
assumptions and identification of the value attributed to them;
(2) the validation of these assumptions with interdisciplinary
literature; and (3) the adoption of a broad perspective
to support more comprehensive reflection on normative
issues.
In this light, we analyze the four major ethical considerations
associated with cognitive enhancement in both conceptual and
empirical literature: (1) safety; (2) autonomy; (3) justice; and
(4) authenticity (Hamilton et al., 2011; Fitz et al., 2013; Farah
et al., 2014). In order to assess the seriousness and likelihood of
these concerns, we analyze the key assumptions underlying each
of these ethical concerns based on the level of available evidence
substantiating them. This analysis then allows us to reconsider
such issues in light of their actual imminence and plausibility in
the context of ethical analyses.
MEMORY ENHANCEMENT WITH tDCS
tDCS devices modify neural activity by conducting weak
electrical current from the entrance electrode(s) via the
scalp, cranium, brain, and then back to the exit electrode(s).
Depending on whether the neural tissue being stimulated
is below the anodal (negative current) or cathodal (positive
current) electrode(s), neuronal excitability will be respectively
increased or decreased (Coffman et al., 2014). tDCS promotes
neuronal activity by increasing the concentration of excitatory
neurotransmitters (e.g., glutamate) and growth factors (e.g.,
brain-derived neurotrophic factor, BDNF) in the synaptic cleft or
by acting on the membrane potential (Levasseur-Moreau et al.,
2013; Coffman et al., 2014; McKendrick et al., 2015). However,
the mechanisms of action of tDCS likely involve different
synaptic and non-synaptic effects on neurons and non-neuronal
(e.g., glial) cells and tissues within the brain (Brunoni et al.,
2011). Compared to other neurostimulation devices (such as
TMS or DBS), tDCS devices are relatively small and affordable
(about 80 dollars when purchased online), easily portable (battery
operated) and less risky (only minor side effects in healthy adults
reported to date; Hildt, 2014; Pustovrh, 2014; Bikson et al., 2016).
Long-lasting effects appear to modulate longer-term protein
synthesis, beyond a mere short-term electronic phenomenon
associated with neurotransmission. Anodal stimulation seems to
increase intra-neuronal levels of calcium and neurotransmitter-
receptor dependent gene expression (see Stagg and Nitsche,
2011). However, the primary mechanism of action is the
polarization of resting membrane potential (see Brunoni et al.,
2011), with effects lasting for up to 1 h.
The apparent effectiveness and lack of common serious
side effects of tDCS, compared to pharmacological enhancers
(Dubljevi´c, 2013) and TMS (Dubljevi´c, 2015), make tDCS a
promising tool and a potential treatment for a number of
diseases (Pascual-Leone et al., 2011). Indeed, recent research
on different memory disorders and symptomatic memory loss
identified the beneficial effects of tDCS for memory disorders
such as Alzheimer’s disease (Ferrucci et al., 2008; Bystad et al.,
2016), post-traumatic stress disorder (Novakovic et al., 2011),
psychiatric disorders which entail working memory loss, and
memory loss resulting from brain damage induced by trauma
or first-stroke episode (Jo et al., 2009; Clark and Parasuraman,
2014). In healthy subjects, use of tDCS in laboratory settings
seems to improve both implicit and explicit memory (Coffman
et al., 2014). For example, tDCS could enhance working memory
involved in motor learning as well as declarative memory when
applied during specific periods of sleep (Marshall et al., 2004).
Anodal stimulation with tDCS could lead to better long-term
memory formation (Rroji et al., 2015), and better memory in
aging, i.e., compensating for normal cognitive decline (Hsu
et al., 2015; but see Fox et al., 2016). tDCS alters plasticity
during learning, and perhaps also during consolidation, resulting
in stronger and more persistent memories (Coffman et al.,
2014).
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The ‘‘easy-to-use’’ nature of tDCS makes it highly accessible,
and tDCS devices are now available for purchase on the web
for everyone interested in self-stimulation (Bikson et al., 2013).
The publicly available information on the ‘‘lay’’ uses of tDCS
even includes YouTube tutorials, which provide information for
applying tDCS and for making the device from readily available
components (Fitz and Reiner, 2013; Dubljevi´c et al., 2014).
MAJOR ETHICAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED
WITH MEMORY ENHANCEMENT WITH
tDCS
There is an emerging convergence in the neuroethics literature
regarding four clusters of ethical issues associated with tDCS
memory enhancement, much like enhancement uses of other
biomedical technologies in healthy individuals: (1) safety;
(2) autonomy; (3) justice; and (4) authenticity (Farah et al., 2004,
2014; Chatterjee, 2006; Hamilton et al., 2011; Fitz et al., 2013).
These are counter-factual issues arising from legitimate or less
legitimate speculations about the future, and so questions about
the validity and prospectivity of these concerns remain. These
questions are especially relevant for the assessment of normative
and regulatory proposals. According to a preventive approach,
speculation can be justified when facing scientific uncertainty in
the case of reasonably foreseeable risks. At the same time, it is
also necessary to engage carefully in speculation about ethical
issues in order to generate a credible ethical analysis, and to assess
which issues are most in need of attention. Acknowledging the
prospective nature of some ethical concerns is relevant, since
such focus on prospective problems may result in missing more
imminent ones. However, prospective analysis in the case of
tDCS is relative, as tDCS is already available on the market
with the specific purpose of improving performance and, in
addition, rapid advances in neuroscience suggest that limits will
be surmounted in the foreseeable future (Schutter, 2014).
We first review each of these four issues as described in the
literature, and then critically analyze each for its plausibility
based on factual assumptions—the first pillar of informed
and reflective pro-active analysis in bioethics (Racine et al.,
2014). The two other steps (validation of assumptions with
interdisciplinary literature, and adopting broader perspectives to
support more comprehensive reflection) are carried out on the
four issues collectively in the subsequent sections.
METHODOLOGICAL GUIDEPOST 1:
ACKNOWLEDGING ASSUMPTIONS MORE
EXPLICITLY AND IDENTIFYING THE
VALUE ATTRIBUTED TO THEM
The four major ethical issues associated with tDCS identified
above each rely in their own way on factual assumptions about
the scientific aspects and societal context of the use of tDCS for
enhancement purposes. Table 1 (below) identifies seven distinct
assumptions: prevalence, social acceptance, efficacy, ideological
stance (bioconservative vs. libertarian), potential for misuse,
long term side effects, and the delivery of complete and clear
TABLE 1 | Major ethical issues related to the use of transcranial direct




Factual assumptions associated with
ethical issues
Safety − Long-term and unknown side effects
− Real benefits
− Potential for misuse
Autonomy
Implicit coercion − Prevalence of use
− Social acceptance
Explicit coercion − Prevalence of use (in some specific context)
− Social acceptance
− Efficacy
Breach of informed consent − Access to clear and complete information
about risks and benefits
Justice
Distributive justice − Efficacy
− Prevalence of use
Fairness − Efficacy
− Prevalence of use
− Ideological stance
Authenticity
Individual authenticity − Efficacy
− Ideological stance
Collective authenticity − Efficacy
− Ideological stance
− Prevalence of use
information. These are regularly featured in the literature to
support the existence of ethical issues associated with tDCS (e.g.,
Hamilton et al., 2011; Hildt, 2013, 2014; Cabrera et al., 2014;
Pustovrh, 2014; Schutter, 2014). For example, the existence of
coercion that would impede autonomy (one of the four major
issues) is contingent on a rather strong acceptance of tDCS (an
example of an assumption) and significant prevalence of the use
of tDCS for memory enhancement. If tDCS was not socially
accepted, coercion would be easily contested and likewise,
explicit coercion would not exist unless specific environment
required the use of tDCS (e.g., in legal, educational or workplace
settings). Another example is the issue of safety, which will only
be at stake if there are long-term side effects or if tDCS is misused
by users in ways that generate additional risks.
Our critical reflection relies on an analysis of the current state
of knowledge about each of these seven assumptions in order to
determine their plausibility. By analyzing current knowledge, we
show that the four ethical issues identified above involve factual
assumptions. The value of such assumptions in prospective
ethical analysis is sometimes acknowledged explicitly by authors
(e.g., Lapenta et al., 2014; Farah, 2015) but often it is not. In order
to identify how realistic and scientifically well founded these
assumptions are, we classify ethical concerns and risks based on
the plausibility of the assumptions they rely on.
Issue 1. Safety
Identification of the Underlying Assumptions
One of the first ethical preoccupations linked to the
use of tDCS for enhancement purposes relates to safety
(Cabrera et al., 2014; Hildt, 2014; Pustovrh, 2014). As tDCS
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is considered non-invasive and used in research settings on
numerous people with only benign and transitory side effects,
this device is usually considered to be relatively safe (Bikson
et al., 2016). However, in the ethics literature, authors worry
about the potentially dangerous long-term and unexpected side
effects of tDCS use, leading to some safety concerns (assumption
about long-term and unknown side effects). In the evaluation
of a device like tDCS, the actual benefits (assumption about real
benefits) come into play since they are balanced with possible
harms. Notably, harms of tDCS also include the enduring of
side-effects associated with potential misuse, overuse, or abuse
(assumption about the potential for misuse).
Explanation of the Role of the Assumptions
Assumptions about long-term and unknown side effects
The risks associated with tDCS, such as headaches, burning
sensations and fatigue (Poreisz et al., 2007) are those that are
actually occurring in the research setting and being reported in
the scientific literature. However, additional unexpected risks
could appear in cases of use outside of controlled laboratory
settings, especially considering the potential repetitive and
long-term use by healthy subjects facilitated by the online
availability of tDCS (Hildt, 2014; Pustovrh, 2014) and risks
associated with ‘‘transfer’’ of this technology to pediatric and
other vulnerable populations (see e.g., Davis, 2014). Concerns
about safety are related to the lack of knowledge and scientific
uncertainty regarding unexpected or long-term side effects of
tDCS enhancement uses (Hildt, 2013; Lapenta et al., 2014).
Thus, these concerns are linked to the probability of long-term
side effects or unexpected side effects, as short-term side effects
reported to date are generally benign and transitory.
Assumptions about real benefits
The evaluation of side effect needs to take into account the
efficacy and real benefits of enhancement with tDCS. Indeed,
the level of reasonably acceptable risk depends on the level of
reasonably expected benefits.
Assumptions about the potential for misuse
Safety concerns suppose that some users will ‘‘misuse’’ the device
(see e.g., Dubljevi´c, 2015). This is especially true for ethical
considerations related to websites selling tDCS devices and
YouTube tutorials providing information for the assembly and
use of homemade devices. As there are no official guidelines for
the use of neuroenhancement, some authors worry about the
appropriate intensity, stimulation duration, exact placement of
electrodes on the scalp and frequency of use (Fitz and Reiner,
2013; Dubljevi´c, 2015).
Thus, safety concerns are based on the assumptions that tDCS
could be dangerous if misused or because of long-term side
effects, and that this risk will outweigh benefits (real benefits of
tDCS in a benefits-risks ratio assessment).
Issue 2: Autonomy
Identification of the Underlying Assumptions
Concerns about memory enhancement involve a potential
challenge to individual autonomy, notably through different
types of coercion (implicit: by social pressure, or explicit: by
requirements from some authority) or through the breach of
informed consent (Farah et al., 2004; Chatterjee, 2006; Cabrera
et al., 2014; Lapenta et al., 2014). A breach of autonomy by social
pressure (implicit coercion) resulting from the productivity
and excellence imperatives of Western societies is worrisome
(CCNE, 2014; Cabrera et al., 2014; Farah et al., 2014). This
scenario relies on tDCS use becoming common (assumption
about prevalence of use). If performance pressures mount,
one might question the liberty of choice to use electrical
neurostimulation to improve cognitive performance and
memory. This coercion could become explicit if enhancement
was practiced or required by parents (for their children), military
forces (for soldiers), or employers (for their employees; Farah
et al., 2004; Hamilton et al., 2011; Cabrera et al., 2014; Maslen
et al., 2014b). Such social influence and acceptance (assumption
about social acceptance), and especially in the case of explicit
coercion, could potentially undermine individual freedom to
choose to enhance or not (Schutter, 2014). A potential violation
of an individual’s informed consent is also worrisome for those
who might have to use these devices, given the lack of knowledge
regarding risks and benefits, as described above (assumption
about access to clear and complete information about risks and
benefits; Hamilton et al., 2011; Cabrera et al., 2014; Hildt, 2014).
Explanation of the Role of the Assumptions
Assumptions about prevalence of use and social acceptance
(implicit coercion)
The emergence of implicit coercion through social pressure
necessarily requires that some individuals or groups perceive a
significant prevalence of use. Indeed, we should worry about
pressure exerted on individuals both in specific contexts (e.g., in
academic or work settings) or in society at large only if a majority,
or a minority of those that are highly successful, actually enhance
a given function (e.g., memory). If no one is enhancing cognitive
functions with tDCS, there would be no pressure for others to
enhance to the level of tDCS users. In addition, if a majority of
people use tDCS for enhancement (e.g., for improving memory),
this is necessarily linked to the presence of a high level of tDCS
enhancement acceptance. A minimally accepted technology will
not be used as much. Implicit coercion is not necessarily linked
to the efficacy and safety of the use of tDCS, provided that side
effects do not become catastrophic, where a halt in use could
be assumed. In sum, the emergence of implicit coercion is based
on two assumptions: a certain threshold of prevalence and broad
public acceptance of the device.
Assumptions about prevalence of use, social acceptance and
efficacy (explicit coercion)
The concern that there will be explicit coercion presupposes the
emergence of a requirement of tDCS use in specific contexts, such
as legal, educational, military or workplace settings. Competitive
spheres where memory enhancement is especially relevant could
easily be affected—for example, as a means to perform better
on an exam. In addition, efficacy is implied by the potential
emergence of such requirements, as well as at least a minimal
guarantee of safety parameters. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
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the emergence of such requirements if tDCS was known to
be dangerous and non-efficient. Thus, we find that there
are three necessary assumptions underlying the appearance of
explicit coercion: prevalence of use (especially in some specific
context), social acceptance and efficacy of tDCS in real life
settings.
Assumptions about access to clear and complete information
about risks and benefits
Finally, concerns about breaches of autonomy and informed
consent imply that clear and complete information is not
provided to users. Some individuals might naively overestimate
benefits and underestimate risks, an especially plausible scenario
because tDCS is widely considered to be non-invasive, potentially
leading to an unduly positive perception of safety (Davis
and van Koningsbruggen, 2013; Fitz and Reiner, 2014; Hildt,
2014). Furthermore, many authors caution that promising
enhancement of cognitive performance and memory is not
advisable at this time, since more research is necessary to validate
potential benefits (Hildt, 2013; Clark and Parasuraman, 2014;
Coffman et al., 2014; Duecker et al., 2014; Pustovrh, 2014). There
are worries that an accurate, evidence-based risk-benefit profile
is difficult to obtain at this time, and that this leads to a breach
of users’ informed consent (Hamilton et al., 2011; Cabrera et al.,
2014; Hildt, 2014). Additionally, given that external stimulation
such as tDCS could modify physiological parameters that play
a role in individual behavior, some express additional concerns
about a risk to the provision of valid consent (Cabrera et al.,
2014). This concern is potentially relevant in the case of clinical
uses of tDCS on people with psychological and neurological
disorders (who are more likely to have difficulty giving valid
consent), but less relevant in the case of use by healthy people.
Accordingly, a breach of informed consent is based on the
assumption that tDCS users will not have access to complete
and clear information about the real risks and benefits of
tDCS.
Issue 3: Justice
Identification of the Underlying Assumptions
Widespread use of tDCS (assumption about prevalence of
use of tDCS for memory enhancement and assumption
about efficacy) may represent a challenge to social and
distributive justice, due to the fear of the emergence of
a class of ‘‘neuroenhanced’’ persons (Farah et al., 2004;
Hamilton et al., 2011; CCNE, 2014). As neuroenhancers
such as tDCS are being developed in greater numbers, there
are concerns about their equitable distribution, which could
be hampered by financial and social barriers, potentially
reinforcing the gap between people with low vs. high socio-
economic status, particularly in the contexts of education and
employment (Farah et al., 2004; Hamilton et al., 2011; CCNE,
2014). Using tDCS may also challenge fairness, especially
in competitive settings. These meritocratic concerns refer
to a specific vision of work and effort: ‘‘no pain no gain’’
(Chatterjee, 2006). Accordingly, increased performance
using tDCS could be viewed as ‘‘cheating’’ (Madan, 2014).
There are two aspects of tDCS use that could contribute to
the view that enhancement uses would in fact be cheating:
breaking formal or informal rules or seeking an unfair
positional advantage in competitive settings. The salience
of these concerns hinges on the underlying biolibertarian
or bioconservative stance (assumption about ideological
stance).
Explanation of the Role of the Assumptions
Assumptions about efficacy and prevalence of use
(distributive justice)
Concerns related to distributive justice are based on the
assumption that tDCS will not be equally distributed. Such
concerns seem clearly plausible in Western societies1 since there
already are a large number of inequalities (Farah et al., 2004;
Chatterjee, 2006; Hamilton et al., 2011). Also worrying is the
potential solicitation of health professionals in the use of these
technologies for treating cognitive disorders which would be part
of the spectrum of ‘‘normal’’, what some call the ‘‘slippery slope’’
of the clinical need (Cabrera et al., 2014). This solicitation raises
other issues relating to the allocation of health resources and the
nature of clinical duty and expertise regarding the distribution
of biomedical devices with enhancement aims (Forlini et al.,
2013; De Ridder et al., 2014; King et al., 2014). Furthermore,
there are concerns that stimulation for personal and lifestyle use
by healthy people will not be supported by medical insurance,
similarly to psychostimulants (Hamilton et al., 2011), restricting
use to people who can pay out of pocket for such improvement.
Non-enhanced individuals could then potentially be seen as
individuals with pathological brain states (Hamilton et al., 2011).
That said, justice issues related to tDCS are relevant only in
the case of an effective technology, leading to proven benefits
and real improvements of cognitive performance or memory
functions. Indeed, there are no real concerns regarding a fair
distribution of a device that does not work or does not bring
real benefits to users. Moreover, because a natural inequality
already places people at different levels of cognitive performance,
some have argued that neuroenhancement could reduce these
inequalities (Greely et al., 2008). In this sense, the principle of
justice may be invoked to defend enhancement uses of tDCS in
order to overcome this natural gap improving individuals with
deficits not connected to a specific pathology or simply those
who are less efficient (Greely et al., 2008). From this perspective,
accessibility of tDCS technology for enhancement would even
constitute a moral duty. However, whichever stance one takes in
terms of justice and enhancement uses, the normative conclusion
can only hold in the case that tDCS is in fact efficacious. Concerns
about justice are also related to prevalence: enhancement use of
tDCS is unfair only if some users have access to this device and
others do not, and if there are formal or informal rules regarding
such use. Thus, two assumptions underlie justice concerns: actual
efficacy of tDCS and prevalence of use.
1However, we should note that Western societies are not necessarily the most
unequal, and that societies with large health and wealth inequalities could also
have lower worker’s rights standards making this issue really international
(Racine and Forlini, 2009).
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Assumptions about ideological stance and assumptions
about efficacy and prevalence of use (fairness)
In addition to assumptions about efficacy and prevalence
of use, concerns about fairness are linked to a certain
ideological stance, notably in the context of the debate between
biolibertarians and bioconservatives. Namely, it would be
justified to enhance cognitive function (from a biolibertarian
perspective) or not (from a bioconservative perspective). Indeed,
the development of tDCS uses within competitive environments
relies on meritocratic arguments, comparable to arguments
about sports doping (Nielsen and Cohen, 2008). Questions
concerning enhancement legitimacy do not spare the use of
tDCS for memory enhancement (Nielsen and Cohen, 2008;
Hamilton et al., 2011; Pustovrh, 2014). These concerns are real
in environments where it could be considered that if these
improvements are neither authentic nor deserved, then they are
not morally commendable (Caplan, 2004; Hamilton et al., 2011).
Thus, assumptions about the actual efficacy of tDCS, prevalence
of use and ideological stance underlie fairness concerns.
Issue 4: Authenticity
Identification of the Underlying Assumptions
Finally, the development of enhancement technologies poses
generic concerns about authenticity and personality. If tDCS
devices actually modify memories (assumption about efficacy),
this could be seen as a possible threat to self-identity and
the meaning of our lives (Farah et al., 2004; Chatterjee,
2006; Racine, 2010; CCNE, 2014), notably the meaning and
nature of human excellence and happiness (Racine, 2010).
At the extreme, questions about authenticity may concern
the modification of ‘‘human nature’’—related to identity and
personality in particular (Hamilton et al., 2011; Cabrera
et al., 2014). This concern is relevant at both the individual
(changing personality) and collective levels (changing the
nature of the human species). Depending on the adopted
worldview (biolibertarian or bioconservative) these changes will
be seen as positive or negative (assumption about ideological
stance).
Explanation of the Role of the Assumptions
Assumptions about efficacy and assumption about
ideological stance (individual authenticity)
It is not clear whether it is probable that tDCS used to improve
cognitive performance can affect collective authenticity. This
question seems reasonable if one is interested in improving
mood or social cognitive characteristics as patience or empathy
(Hamilton et al., 2011). However, these improvements are
highly dependent on the actual efficacy of the device. Major
changes to our species (collective authenticity) or to each
personality (individual authenticity) would require a substantial
change for both working memory, for which there is some
evidence, and long-term memory for a substantial portion
of the population. In addition, it should be noted that
the considerations relating to authenticity greatly depend on
ideological stance. Indeed, whether such modifications could be
seen as risky for authenticity or as benefiting any single human
crucially depends on whether one adopts a bioconservative
or biolibertarian worldview. Response to these concerns is
thus linked to two assumptions: efficacy and ideological
stance.
Assumptions about efficacy, ideological stance and
prevalence of use (collective authenticity)
Human species modification on a great number of individuals
also presupposes a high prevalence. Thus, a breach in collective
authenticity strongly depends on efficacy, ideological stance and





Acknowledging the existence of assumptions is a first step, but
the critical analysis of these assumptions needs to be carried out
to assess the plausibility of individual ethical issues. In order to
achieve this, we scrutinize the assumptions identified above in
light of the available empirical data and scientific literature.
Assumptions About Long-Term and
Unknown Side Effects
Several non-exclusive conceptual models have been offered
in order to explain the underlying mechanisms of tDCS
effects on the brain (Levasseur-Moreau et al., 2013). One
of them is a ‘‘zero-sum theory’’, also known as ‘‘addition-
by-subtraction’’ (Levasseur-Moreau et al., 2013; Brem et al.,
2014; Luber, 2014). This model assumes that neural capacity
is limited, meaning that the brain has a determined total
capacity, which implies that a cognitive gain is necessarily
accompanied by a negative impact on one or more other
functions (Levasseur-Moreau et al., 2013; Brem et al., 2014).
Accordingly, the enhancement of performance would be
the result of a reallocation of brain resources (Levasseur-
Moreau et al., 2013; Brem et al., 2014). Brain mechanisms
responsible for the desired performance would be privileged,
to the detriment of competing neural networks responsible
for non-essential or less essential needs. The validation of this
model is necessary because it would bring more attention to
the undesirable side effects of neuroenhancement, which have
been poorly investigated to date (Luber, 2014). Indeed, there
is some evidence that electrical stimulation could enhance
some cognitive functions only to the detriment of others
(Iuculano and Cohen Kadosh, 2013; Brem et al., 2014;
Kadosh, 2015). Notably, Iuculano and Cohen Kadosh (2013),
in one of the first studies investigating dual-dissociation tasks
with transcranial neurostimulation technologies, demonstrated
a cognitive cost associated to numerical learning tasks.
Application of transcranial electrical stimulation lead either to
an improvement of the learning rate but not of the automation
process, or to the exact opposite, depending on whether one
stimulates the posterior parietal cortex or the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex, respectively. This cognitive cost could mainly
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be due to a change in the metabolic consumption and
neurochemical modulation after electrical stimulation (Iuculano
and Cohen Kadosh, 2013). However, the ‘‘zero-sum theory’’
model is only appropriate when stimulation induces changes
in a limited capacity system and does not apply to a situation
where non-invasive brain stimulation (such as tDCS) increases
overall resources (Luber, 2014). Thus, in many cases, identifying
a cost is difficult. For certain functions, it may be that the
brain is not finite and can always enhance its capabilities, and
sometimes stimulationmay add to the resources available (Luber,
2014).
For now, side effects of tDCS are minor and transitory, even
if some exceptional cases of syncope (black-out), seizure or
transient respiratory arrest have been reported (Nitsche et al.,
2003; Poreisz et al., 2007; Pustovrh, 2014; Dubljevi´c, 2015;
Ekici, 2015). tDCS could also induce phosphenes (subjective
perception of short light flashes) if the current is suddenly
removed (Nitsche et al., 2003). Since the underlying brain
mechanisms of this technology are little understood at this
time, the cognitive effects of tDCS neuroenhancement deserve
further investigation and attention. More studies should be
performed in order to validate the designation of tDCS as safe
outside the laboratory setting. Long-term side effects have not
been sufficiently investigated to support a move to daily use,
and no formal or official guidelines are currently prescribed
for potential private use (Fitz and Reiner, 2013; De Ridder
et al., 2014; Hildt, 2014). To date, there is no evidence for
irreversible injury produced by conventional tDCS research
protocols and no serious adverse side effects in trained tDCS use,
as reported by Bikson et al. (2016) in a review of studies grouping
33,000 sessions and over 1000 subjects who received repeated
tDCS sessions. However, several notes of caution have been
raised for self-directed stimulation including potential overuse,
unexpected effects with inappropriate dose and the long term use,
as well as variable naturalistic setting of home-use (Bikson et al.,
2016).
tDCS could also interact with other existing medications; this
has been scarcely investigated so far, along with the potential
effects of other factors such as gender, age and handedness
(De Ridder et al., 2014; Fitz and Reiner, 2014). It is possible
that certain existing medications could enhance tDCS effects.
Also, neuronal excitability, on which tDCS has an effect, is by
nature very variable between one individual to another (De
Ridder et al., 2014; Horvath et al., 2014). Therefore, individual
differences related to plasticity and tolerance should be explored
in-depth, especially since there is some evidence of addictive
reactions to electrical stimulation in animals (Heinz et al., 2012,
in Levasseur-Moreau et al., 2013). Moreover, some authors
acknowledge the need for more studies investigating the effects
of tDCS on pregnant women and children (Minhas et al.,
2012; Maslen et al., 2014b). This is problematic because there
are currently no restrictions on who can use tDCS outside
of clinical and research setting, and a recent case of seizure
induced by tDCS in a pediatric patient has been reported
(Ekici, 2015). Short-term changes in brain plasticity that are
caused by tDCS could also induce long-term changes in certain
neuronal functions, leading to unintended effects which could
be difficult to reverse (Cabrera et al., 2014; Fitz and Reiner,
2014).
Assumptions About Efficacy and Actual
Benefits
As previously discussed, tDCS for memory enhancement shows
promising effects on the memory of healthy people. The
conclusion that tDCS improves cognition in laboratory settings
still does not mean that a transition to real life use is warranted.
Potential benefits are thus debatable, as study designs on healthy
individuals present some important limitations regarding their
ecological validity (De Ridder et al., 2014; McKendrick et al.,
2015). The ecological validity of experimental tasks needs to
be improved. Namely, it is necessary to increase the control of
external factors that could have an impact on expected effects (for
example, acting under stress; Levasseur-Moreau et al., 2013). In
addition, it should be noted that cognitive enhancement research
on healthy participants has limitations: any enhancement effect
may depend on the context, motivation, mental effort and
individual differences (Schutter, 2014). These limits are also
methodological: participants are volunteers, which has an impact
on the expected effect (CCNE, 2014) and this restricts the
transition from research to practice (Schutter, 2014).Moreover, it
is questionable whether these technologies are powerful enough
to have an actual cognitive impact in real-life settings, especially
concerning their magnitude and duration (Levasseur-Moreau
et al., 2013). Thus, it seems particularly appropriate to question
the advertising of benefits of tDCS devices that are commercially
available. For example, a recent study has shown that the use
of one of these commercially available devices does not improve
working memory as advertised, but in fact impairs this cognitive
function in healthy study participants (Steenbergen et al., 2015).
Thus, at least some of the benefits promised by producers of
commercial tDCS devices have not materialized and may not be
evidence-based. Finally, it will be necessary to compare the real
benefits of tDCS to the efficacy of traditional memory enhancers
(e.g., training, or sleep) to evaluate the actual contribution
and advantage of this device (as proposed in Dresler et al.,
2013).
Assumption About Potential for Misuse of
tDCS
Safety concerns are related to the assumption that private
users of tDCS will misuse the device. Indeed, we could
question the users’ expertise and worry about their capacity
to choose the appropriate frequency, intensity and location
of electrical stimulation. A recent study conducted by Jwa
(2015) shows that tDCS users are actually aware of basic
safety rules and are concerned about potential risks—especially
risks of potential impairment of the brain and the use of
incorrect positions of electrodes (Jwa, 2015). Furthermore, users
gather information about risks and appropriate use in scientific
literature. At the same time, users acknowledge the need for
official or expert guidelines—even if they are concerned about
excessive government regulation (Jwa, 2015). However, there
are important limitations that should be mentioned. The single
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study on tDCS users relied on a convenience sample, which
might bias the results. Also, the anonymous participants were
mostly adults so the study might not adequately represent
the perceptions of adolescents, who are more at risk for
impulsive decision-making and misuse in different settings
(Powell, 2006). While these limitations should be addressed in
further studies, this study suggests that fully competent adult
users of tDCS will most likely not misuse tDCS, as long as
official guidelines and information about safe use is made
available.
Assumption About Clear and Complete
Information About Risks
Various aspects discussed so far lead to a conclusion that
providing clear and complete information on the risks of
enhancement uses of tDCS is difficult, if not impossible, at
this time. A first concern arises from the designation given
to the technology: lack of knowledge about potential risks (as
presented above) is particularly problematic since technologies
such as tDCS are widely considered and described as ‘‘non-
invasive’’ brain stimulation (Davis and van Koningsbruggen,
2013; Duecker et al., 2014). The notion of non-invasiveness
could lead to misinterpretations that may confer a false sense
of safety (Davis and van Koningsbruggen, 2013; Cabrera et al.,
2014; Hildt, 2014). In presenting these devices as non-invasive,
patients, participants or private users might overestimate benefits
and underestimate risks (Davis and van Koningsbruggen, 2013;
Hildt, 2014). On the other hand, recategorizing tDCS explicitly
as ‘‘invasive’’ could be an exaggerated reaction, potentially
inducing unfounded fear (Davis and van Koningsbruggen, 2013).
It has been proposed that these devices be described as ‘‘brain
stimulation techniques’’, without mention of invasiveness (Davis
and van Koningsbruggen, 2013). tDCS could also be described
as ‘‘minimally invasive’’ (Cabrera et al., 2014), highlighting the
fact that this technique imposes an exogenous current to the
brain.
In addition to the described invasiveness of tDCS, other
elements must be considered to ensure clear and accurate
information. For example, risk-taking for enhancement is
perhaps less justified given the lack of clarity regarding the
real benefits for healthy users (Farah et al., 2004; Chatterjee,
2006; see ‘‘efficacy’’ above). The minimum level of acceptable
risk in the case of cognitive enhancement is to be established
for both daily applications and in research protocols involving
healthy subjects: such an acceptable minimum should be reduced
proportionately to the decrease in benefits for participants (Farah
et al., 2004). Thus, given the lack of knowledge about risks and
benefits associated with enhancement use of tDCS, some authors
describe the behavior of current users as ‘‘self-experimentation’’
(Cabrera et al., 2014; Davis, 2016). Even in the case in which it is
assumed that people using tDCS at home have made a deliberate
choice to take the risk for themselves, it is currently impossible
to make a truly informed choice, i.e., a choice based on reliable
information about risks and benefits and about the parameters of
appropriate stimulation (Hildt, 2014). Thus, the assumption that
real and complete information will not be available for users is
confirmed.
Assumption About Prevalence of Use
Prevalence of tDCS enhancement research is something growing
exponentially. Research has shown that 250 neuroscience studies
using tDCS were published in 2013, compared to less than
50 in 2006 (Dubljevi´c et al., 2014). Even if the high volume
of scientific studies might suggest high prevalence of lifestyle
uses, the number of private users of tDCS is still uncertain.
We may suppose that there are thousands of one-time users
and perhaps several hundred continuous users based on online
availability and forum discussions (Jwa, 2015). For example,
the company foc.us was out of stock due to high demand
within a month: 3000 tDCS units were sold in the month of
May 2013 (Jwa, 2015). However, this could not be considered
as valid data for evaluating the actual prevalence of private
tDCS use, as acknowledged by Farah (2015). As tDCS devices
in various configurations are already available online and can
be easily created with the help of readily available electronic
components and YouTube tutorials, there is likely a small but
growing population of at-home users. Given that enhancement
with tDCS is not approved in clinical settings, the prevalence
of clinical use is likely very low. An explicit requirement of
use in specific contexts, such as educational, army or workplace
settings, does not exist to date. The Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency’s (DARPA) growing interest in enhancement
projects for neurotechnologies (such as tDCS), their large budget
($2.87 billion enacted budget for the year 2016) and the amounts
they involve for academic research (estimated at around 90% of
DARPA’s budget) suggests that the prospective concern about
requirements of use might have some merit, at least in military
contexts (seeMoreno, 2012; Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency, 2016).
Assumption About Social Acceptance
Social acceptance of tDCS is essentially reliant on a favorable
public attitude toward performance improvement and
memory enhancement uses. However, public attitudes toward
enhancement have not been sufficiently investigated. One of
the few studies on this topic has shown that the public, far
from being ignorant and incompetent on such concerns, adopts
a ‘‘biopolitically moderate’’ stance on the challenges related
to the development of neuroenhancement (Fitz et al., 2013).
Study participants’ reactions to the four main questions raised
by neuroethicists were tested, i.e., regarding safety, fairness,
authenticity and societal pressure (Fitz et al., 2013). More
studies on this topic could lead to an understanding of a general
opinion regarding this phenomenon, which may be extremely
variable from one population to another, even within Western
societies themselves. Public opinion was also investigated in
a literature review (Dijkstra and Schuijff, 2016) and it was
found that while there are debates in many countries (within
Europe, North America and Asia) about public attitudes to
human enhancement (see Jotterand and Dubljevi´c, 2016),
only 38 studies have been carried out over 13 years. This
review showed that the public is moderately to strongly against
non-medical uses of technology, that reasons which lead to
these uses are perceived as worse when driven by personal
goals than by social reasons, and that this attitude depends
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on the type of technology in question (Dijkstra and Schuijff,
2016). However, the above mentioned study by Fitz et al.
(2013) addressed ethical concerns in a more comprehensive
way. This study suggests that individuals have more propensity
to accept risk when the goal is treatment than when it is
to enhance performance without substantial differences in
opinions between technologies (e.g., tDCS vs. pharmacological
drugs; Fitz et al., 2013). In the same study, it was reported that
‘‘soft’’ peer pressure seems more problematic than pressure
from society as a whole. Furthermore, authenticity is viewed in
a consequentialist manner: merit is greater when observing a
success, regardless of the means of getting there, but perception
of worthiness is increased when performance is derived from
hard work (Fitz et al., 2013). Differences in sampling and
characteristics of populations investigated (online vs. traditional
surveys, Europe vs. North America) might contribute to the
diversity in results generated so far. More empirical studies of
prevalence and public perception, and conceptual analyses of
social and cultural norms across the globe are needed before
firm conclusions can be drawn (Jotterand and Dubljevi´c,
2016).
Assumption About Ideological Stance
Ideological stances affect several aspects relevant for ethical
reflection on tDCS. Most notably, in the absence of clear formal
rules, the acceptance of informal rules which would designate
the use of tDCS as cheating, or as legitimate, is crucially
dependent on the ideological stance. The bioconservative stance
highlights the potential negative impact cognitive enhancement
can have on human achievement (Racine, 2010). Always
extending the boundaries of the norm might lead to an
endless quest in which no one is benefitting and everyone
has to endure side-effects. At the same time, a biolibertarian
approach considers such use as beneficent, and identifies
many problems that these technologies could now solve
such as performance anxiety, lack of sleep, and loss of
attention. Also, for some authors, enhancement and virtue
may coexist (Caplan, 2004). While it is indeed satisfying to
overcome challenges pushing one’s own boundaries, it can
also be satisfying to get profits that ‘‘fall from the sky’’
(Caplan, 2004). In other words, we do not always need to
earn our happiness to be really happy, and the perceived
authenticity of our actions is not necessarily a result of
the suffering that went into their fulfillment (Caplan, 2004).
However such claims could be counter to evidence gathered
in social psychology where the intrinsic nature of motivations
is associated with positive contributions to happiness and
genuine self-fulfillment (Ryan and Deci, 2000). Furthermore,
according to the biolibertarian approach, an individual must
be free to choose to enhance their performance because there
are allegedly no substantial differences with other types of
improvement such as tutoring or exercise (Racine, 2010).
So far, the actual improvement of well-being and happiness
achieved by enhancement is questionable (Dresler et al., 2013;
Madan, 2014; Nagel, 2014; Schleim, 2014). Also, there is
some evidence to suggest that the public is neither strictly
neoconservative nor bio-libertarian, but instead ‘‘bio-politically

















moderate’’ (Fitz et al., 2013), which puts the questions of
which informal rules are actually accepted to the forefront
of missing data that should be populated by empirical
results.
Most Plausible and Imminent Issues
In sum, most issues and sub-issues identified (see Table 2) are
supported by modestly evidenced assumptions. Therefore, our
analysis of underlying assumptions suggest that at least two
issues/sub-issues, safety and autonomy (informed consent), are
plausible and imminent. Indeed, safety concerns are not certain,
but in view of the potential dangerous nature of unknown
and unexpected side effects (there is no data to invalidate the
ethical assumption), such concerns deserve to be duly considered
in regulatory approaches. Additionally, we conclude that the
worries about breach of informed consent are real and actual:
there is not enough reliable information available for users and,
in fact, users are perhaps misled by commercial enterprises
selling tDCS devices.
Three assumptions, autonomy (implicit coercion),
distributive justice, and fairness are less plausible and imminent,
as the limited currently available data is insufficient to infirm or
confirm the assumptions on which there are based.
Finally, three assumptions are much less plausible and
are rather distant: autonomy (explicit coercion), authenticity
(individual), and authenticity (collective). Indeed, explicit
coercion is less urgent to address, as there is no current explicit
requirement of tDCS in any specific context to date (here, actual
data invalidate the assumption). Both authenticity concerns are
highly prospective as currently available scientific knowledge
is not sufficient to confirm assumptions about consequent
efficacy and prevalence, and because such concerns are extremely
dependent on ideological stance.
METHODOLOGICAL GUIDEPOST 3:
ADOPT A BROAD PERSPECTIVE TO
SUPPORT MORE COMPREHENSIVE
REFLECTION
To adopt a broad perspective, Racine et al. (2014) suggest
three relevant strategies to support a more reflective practice
of bioethics: comparing disciplinary frameworks, considering
historical knowledge, and reflecting on the development of
normative approaches (Racine et al., 2014).
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Compare Disciplinary Frameworks
As acknowledged by Racine et al. (2014), one of the major
concerns is that the terminology of ‘‘cognitive enhancement’’
reflects a specific dominant framework in bioethics which
already implies some benefits on which we have very limited
evidence. This dominant framework sometimes contrasts with
other perspectives on non-medical uses of stimulants (e.g.,
within the public health literature, which emphasizes issues
such as addiction or public harm). To analyze cognitive
enhancement uses solely though the bioethics perspective—that
could be extended to bioethics perspective of tDCS non-medical
uses—may limit discussion and possible solutions. For example,
concerns about distributive justice and fairness have to be
addressed in regulatory approaches to tDCS according to future
evidence on its efficacy for cognitive enhancement (in terms
of memory and overall performance). This is because currently
available scientific data does not confirm these assumptions.
Therefore, such issues are thus highly dependent on the buy-in
to the ‘‘cognitive enhancement’’ framework.
Consider Historical Knowledge
As described by Racine et al. (2014), enhancement is not
a new phenomenon. A historical perspective could help to
assess social and cultural context of cognitive enhancement
(Racine et al., 2014) with tDCS. Indeed, the trajectory of use of
any enhancers seems to follow an enthusiasm/disillusionment
cycle (Bell et al., 2012). This is exemplified by the history of
pharmacological stimulants, such as cocaine and amphetamine:
they first met an uncritical enthusiasm in view of the drug effects,
until evidence of addiction and dangerous side effects emerged,
which led to a sharp increase in societal concerns (Bell et al.,
2012). Similarly, many innovations in electrotherapy (e.g., the
‘‘Electreat’’, a transcutaneous electrical nerve stimulation device
using electrical shocks in the early 20th century) have been the
object of strong enthusiasm before the emergence of skepticism.
Such skepticism surrounding the lack of scientific evidence
of effectiveness and some use by opportunistic individuals
taking advantage of public hopes (Basford, 2001). Thus, electric
and magnetic approaches to treating disease and enhancing
performance seem to follow the same kind of cycle, as noted
by Basford (2001): ‘‘a pattern seems to reappear. In each era,
unsophisticated public acceptance is met first with medical
disdain, then with investigation, and, finally, with a failure to
find objective evidence of efficacy’’ (Basford, 2001, p.1). At the
same time, we should consider that every memory enhancement
tool has been viewed as ethically problematic in a given period
(Madan, 2014).
Moreover, considering the changing nature of standards,
medical values, and goals in our contemporary societies, a strict
line between what is ‘‘normal’’ and ‘‘pathological’’ is hardly
possible (Maslen et al., 2014a; Pustovrh, 2014) and historical
examples of the evolution of boundaries between enhancement
and medical uses support some caution about the usefulness
of this dichotomy. Specific diagnostic criteria define when a
person suffers from a mental disorder, as established by the
different editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-5, now in its fifth version). However,
such criteria regularly change, and even today consensus is
lacking on their definition. For example, homosexuality was
defined as a mental disorder by DSM-II in 1968, and was
given the rank of first sexual deviation (Minard, 2009). The
establishment of new criteria for mental disorders in the latest
DSM also caused reaction based on the concern that, according
to the new criteria, everyone could be diagnosed with a mental
disorder (Pearce, 2014). Considering the current phenomenon
of a biomedicalization of society—and of under-performance
in particular—(Le Dévédec and Guis, 2013), it is particularly
difficult to restrict the risks and ethical issues of cognitive
enhancement to individuals considered as ‘‘healthy’’. This notion
might ultimately refer to an overly broad (or limited) spectrum
of individuals, and the blurred line between ‘‘normal’’ and
‘‘pathological’’ could make the implementation of regulatory
policies on enhancers such as tDCS difficult.
Thus, what we learn from the history of science is that we
should cautiously consider issues based on ideological stance
and related to public acceptance for the purposes of normative
evaluation. Indeed, ideological stances and public acceptance can
move and change according to context and time. This leads us
to acknowledge the need for a context-dependent approach in
the implementation of policies with regard to issues such as
authenticity. That said, historical knowledge should be carefully
considered in ethical analysis. If previous conclusions about
electrotherapy or memory enhancement gave a distorted picture,
current expert opinion should be taken with a dose of skepticism,
as previous and actual risks may not have been considered in the
same way.
Reflect on the Development of Normative
Approaches
Finally, given the calls to provide regulatory responses to
non-medical uses of tDCS, it is important to critically
review policy proposals as well as their underlying normative
assumptions, as recommended by Racine et al. (2014).
Maslen et al. (2014a) suggest extending the biomedical model
to the enhancement uses of neurostimulation devices. This
regulatory approach could be relevant because devices are the
same for clinical use and for enhancement use—this is true for
psychostimulants or DBS but less obvious for tDCS, which is
not yet officially approved as a therapeutic tool—and because
of the blurred and shifting line between the ‘‘normal’’ and the
‘‘pathological’’ (Maslen et al., 2014a). At the same time, by
removing this distinction, the biomedical model reinforces the
risk of distorting health priorities (CCNE, 2014). This risk is
especially worrisome in a context where health resources are
limited, raising the question of the legitimacy of using these
resources in an enhancement context, namely for improving
performance (De Ridder et al., 2014), especially since benefits
and risks are uncertain (Forlini and Racine, 2012). Moreover,
expanding biomedical approval to tDCS devices could create a
false perception that these technologies are beneficial (De Ridder
et al., 2014). In addition, such regulation does not include all
modalities of tDCS. Unlike other biomedical technologies such as
psychostimulants, tDCS is indefinitely reusable. The biomedical
model should not be applied to tDCS only as a medical service,
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 10 January 2017 | Volume 10 | Article 678
Voarino et al. tDCS for Memory Enhancement
because this overlooks the fact that it also exists as a product and
do-it-yourself gadget (Dubljevi´c, 2015).
Another proposal from Fitz and Reiner (2013) is the creation
of an official online forum where the community of tDCS
users could receive advice and safety guidelines, with the ability
to consult an expert scientist or clinician. This approach is
guided by a principle of harm reduction, and aligns with current
tDCS users’ requests for advice and expertise, as observed in
unofficial online forums (Fitz and Reiner, 2014). It would have
the advantage of being less intrusive in terms of state involvement
and costs associated with its implementation in comparison to
the first option described. However, this solution is not without
costs, particularly related to the availability of experts (Fitz
and Reiner, 2013). Since no additional specific measures are
developed, the proposal implies the voluntary participation of
health professionals. Managing risks through an online forum
could also increase the number of tDCS users (Fitz and Reiner,
2014).
Some authors offer to frame tDCS devices for their personal
use, without considering them as medical devices, by promoting
awareness and public education (De Ridder et al., 2014), or
even establishing a licensing procedure (Dubljevi´c, 2015). To
prevent the risks associated withmisaligned stimulation intensity
or positioning of electrodes, user manuals and training could
be in place to ensure a minimum level of professional control
before allowing private use, which could for example restrict the
personal use of tDCS for trained users over 25 years (De Ridder
et al., 2014; Dubljevi´c, 2015). This kind of regulation would seek
to limit doses and ages of users (De Ridder et al., 2014; Dubljevi´c,
2015).
Different societies are likely to opt for different policies,
and it may turn out that none of the proposals mentioned
here are actually implemented. Indeed, our analysis should not
be construed as arguing for a specific normative approach.
However, the presence of plausible and imminent risks highlights
the need for a broad discussion regarding development and
implementation of policies, which would provide official
guidelines and adequate information or education to users.
At a minimum, such guidelines should present risks of tDCS
use and real benefits to users, based on the actual level of
knowledge supporting them. The lack of clarity on long-term
side effects and efficacy of the devices in real life setting should
also be conveyed by manufacturers and others involved in their
commercialization.
CONCLUSION
tDCS is a neurotechnology under intense investigation. From
a rather marginal and obscure neurostimulation device, it has
become the center of debates about the use of non-invasive
neurostimulation for cognitive enhancement purposes. A
number of important ethical issues are associated with cognitive
enhancement uses of tDCS. Relying on a reflective pro-active
methodology for bioethical analysis, we found that a number
of assumptions presupposed by these issues are rather lacking
in supporting evidence and in need of much greater scrutiny.
For example, breach of informed consent (an autonomy-related
issue) is one of the most imminent and actual ethical issues
as we do not have enough data to ensure the availability
of clear and complete information about risks and benefits.
Meanwhile, authenticity issues are highly speculative and less
urgent to address in terms of policy, because they are based on
assumptions of high prevalence and consistent efficacy that are
not supported by strong evidence. However, our analysis does
not negate the importance of more speculative issues: even if
such concerns are less urgent, they also deserve some attention
and caution. Furthermore, we acknowledge that speculation has
some important and relevant functions in neuroethics analysis,
according to preventive approaches and proactive management
of risks. We observed that applying different methodological
strategies such as the comparison of disciplinary frameworks
revealed that the discourse in which current discussions are
embedded (e.g., ‘‘cognitive enhancement’’) carries with it a
number of assumptions that should be critically assessed as
policy and regulatory responses to tDCS start to be debated
and envisioned. Thus, we highlight the need for managing
private use of tDCS without further delay and argue that
relevant implementation of policies and regulation need first
and foremost to take into account most urgent and realistic
issues.
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